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Evolutionary game theory (EGT) has become a powerful
mathematical framework for the modelling and analysis of
complex biological/economical systems whenever there is
frequency dependent selection – the fitness of an individual
does not only depend on its strategy, but also on the com-
position of the population in relation with (multiple) other
strategies (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998). The payoff from the games is interpreted
as individual fitness, naturally leading to a dynamical ap-
proach. Random evolutionary games in which the payoff
entries are random variables form an important subclass of
EGT. They are necessary to model social and biological sys-
tems in which very limited information is available, or where
the environment changes so rapidly and frequently that one
cannot describe the payoffs of their inhabitants’ interactions
(Fudenberg and Harris, 1992; Gross et al., 2009). As in
classical game theory with the Nash equilibrium, see e.g.
(McLennan, 2005), the analysis of properties of equilibrium
points in EGT has been of special interest, see e.g. (Gokhale
and Traulsen, 2010). These equilibrium points predict the
composition of strategy frequencies where all the strategies
have the same average fitness. In random games, due to the
randomness of the payoff entries, it is essential to study sta-
tistical properties of equilibria. How to determine the distri-
bution of internal equilibria in random evolutionary games
is an intensely investigated subject with numerous practi-
cal ramifications in ecology, population genetics, social sci-
ences, economics and computer science providing essential
understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as
its behavioural, cultural or biological diversity and the main-
tenance of polymorphism. Properties of equilibrium points,
particularly the probability of observing the maximal num-
ber of equilibrium points, the attainability and stability of the
patterns of evolutionarily stable strategies have been stud-
ied recently (Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010; Han et al., 2012;
Gokhale and Traulsen, 2014). However, as these papers used
a direct approach that consists of solving a system of poly-
nomial equations, the mathematical analysis was mostly re-
stricted to evolutionary games with a small number of play-
ers, due to the impossibility of solving general polynomial
equations of a high degree.
In this extended abstract, we present a summary of our
recent works (Duong and Han, 2015, 2016; Duong et al.,
2018b,a), in which we analyze random evolutionary games
with an arbitrary number of players. The key technique
that we develop is to connect the number of equilibria in an
evolutionary game to the number of real roots of a system
of multi-variate random polynomials (Bharucha-Reid and
Sambandham, 1986; Edelman and Kostlan, 1995). Assum-
ing that we consider d-player n-strategy evolutionary games,
then the system consists of n − 1 polynomial equations of
degree d− 1:
∑
0≤k1,...,kn−1≤d−1,
n−1∑
i=1
ki≤d−1
βik1,...,kn−1
(
d− 1
k1, ..., kn
) n−1∏
i=1
ykii = 0,
for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. Here βik1,...,kn−1 := αik1,...,kn −
αnk1,...,kn where α
i0
k1,...,kn
:= αi0i1,...,id−1 is the payoff of the
focal player and ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, with
∑n
i=1 ki = d − 1, is
the number of players using strategy i in {i1, . . . , id−1}. In
(Duong and Han, 2015, 2016), we analyze the mean number
E(n, d) and the expected density f(n, d) of internal equi-
libria in a general d-player n-strategy evolutionary game
when the individuals’ payoffs are independent, normally dis-
tributed. We provide computationally implementable for-
mulas of these quantities for the general case and charac-
terize their asymptotic behaviour for the two-strategy games
(i.e. E(2, d) and f(2, d)), estimating their lower and upper
bounds as d increases. For instance, under certain assump-
tions on the payoffs, we obtain
• Asymptotic behaviour of E(2, d):
√
d− 1 . E(2, d) . √d− 1 ln(d− 1).
As a consequence,
lim
d→∞
lnE(2, d)
ln(d− 1) =
1
2
.
• Explicit formula of E(n, 2): E(n, 2) = 12n−1 .
For a general d-player n-strategy game, as supported by ex-
tensive numerical results, we describe a conjecture regard-
ing the asymptotic behaviours of E(n, d) and f(n, d). We
also show that the probability of seeing the maximal possi-
ble number of equilibria tends to zero when d or n respec-
tively goes to infinity and that the expected number of stable
equilibria is bounded within a certain interval.
In (Duong et al., 2018b) we generalize our analysis for
random evolutionary games where the payoff matrix entries
are correlated random variables. In social and biological
contexts, correlations may arise in various scenarios particu-
larly when there are environmental randomness and interac-
tion uncertainty such as in games of cyclic dominance, co-
evolutionary multi-games or when individual contributions
are correlated to the surrounding contexts (e.g. due to lim-
ited resource)(Szolnoki and Perc, 2014; Santos et al., 2012).
We establish a closed formula for the mean numbers of in-
ternal (stable) equilibria and characterize the asymptotic be-
haviour of this important quantity for large group sizes and
study the effect of the correlation. The results show that de-
creasing the correlation among payoffs (namely, of a strate-
gist for different group compositions) leads to larger mean
numbers of (stable) equilibrium points, suggesting that the
system or population behavioral diversity can be promoted
by increasing independence of the payoff entries.
As a further development, in (Duong et al., 2018a) we
derive a closed formula for the distribution of internal equi-
libria, for both normal and uniform distributions of the game
payoff entries. We also provide several universal upper and
lower bound estimates, which are independent of the under-
lying payoff distribution, for the probability of obtaining a
certain number of internal equilibria. In addition, the asymp-
totic behaviour of the probability of having no internal equi-
libria is then obtained (Can et al., 2018). The distribution
of equilibria provides more elaborate information about the
level of complexity or the number of different states of bio-
diversity that will occur in a dynamical system, compared to
what obtained with the expected number of internal equilib-
ria.
In short, by connecting EGT to random polynomial the-
ory, we have achieved new results on the expected number
and distribution of internal equilibria in multi-player multi-
strategy games. Our studies provide new insights into the
overall complexity of dynamical systems, including biologi-
cal, social and Artificial Life ones, as the numbers of players
and strategies in an interaction within the systems increase.
As the theory of random polynomials is rich, we expect that
our novel approach can be extended to obtain results for
other more complex models in population dynamics such as
the replicator-mutator equation and evolutionary games with
environmental feedback (Weitz et al., 2016).
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